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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether UK executives use private information in the trading 
decisions associated with the exercise of their executive stock options. We find that 
UK executives’ exercise and sell decisions are motivated by their private information 
but not by their anticipation of future return volatility. These findings appear robust 
when we control for additional motivating factors that include option moneyness, the 
previous stock return and the value of the exercise. We argue that the disparity in the 
informativeness of US and UK executives’ trades at exercise is related to important 
differences in executive remuneration, and in the regulation and taxation of executive 
stock options. 
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PRIVATE INFORMATION IN EXECUTIVES’ OPTION TRADES: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE UK 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines the information contained in the trades associated with 
option exercises by UK executives. There are significant differences in the 
remuneration of US and UK executives that makes an analysis of the UK an 
interesting test case. In contrast to the US where executives sell almost all the stock 
acquired at exercise, we find that UK executives sell less than one half, on average. 
Our main hypothesis is that, if executives incorporate their private information in their 
trading decisions, then the proportion of acquired stock that is sold will be related to, 
or influenced by, the executives’ expectations about future stock return performance. 
In both a univariate analysis, and a multivariate analysis that controls for the 
additional factors that might motivate their trading decisions including previous stock 
returns, option moneyness, firm size and exercise value, we show that the proportion 
of stock sold by UK executives at option exercise contains significant information for 
future stock returns. In addition, we find some limited evidence that is consistent with 
dividend capture being a motive for some trading decisions. We do not, however, 
find any evidence that is consistent with UK executives’ trading decisions being 
informed about future stock return volatility.  
The finding of an information content in UK executives’ trades at option 
exercise is in contrast to previous studies based on US data that concludes that 
these are uninformed trades. We propose several reasons that explain why such 
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trades in the UK are informed. We suggest that our findings can be explained by 
differences in executives’ remuneration, regulation and the taxation of option gains in 
the two countries. In the US, executives’ remuneration has been much more closely 
linked to shareholder wealth. As a result, US executives hold relatively undiversified 
personal portfolios, to the extent that they will be prepared to exercise and sell 
irrespective of their private information. We argue that UK executives have greater 
personal portfolio diversification (compared to their US counterparts), which reduces 
their need to exercise and sell in order to diversify. However, UK executives will still 
be motivated to exercise their options prior to expiration because of the four times 
emoluments rule that restricts the total value of their options to four times their pay 
plus bonus. Exercising their options early therefore facilitates the granting of 
additional options (see section III). Finally, UK executives are more likely to hold the 
acquired shares, not only because their need to diversify is less pressing, but also 
because sales bring forward a tax liability associated with option gains. Hence, UK 
executives’ decisions to exercise and sell are more likely to contain executives’ 
negative private information.  
The existing research on the informativeness of insiders’ trades examines, for 
the most part, the information contained in executives’ non-option related purchase 
and sale decisions. Whilst there is evidence that such trades are informed, there is 
little support for informed trading in executives’ option related trades. Our findings 
therefore extend this research, and show that executives’ use of their private 
information extends to trades associated with their option exercise decisions. 
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II outlines the 
existing literature on informed trading by executives. In section III we discuss the 
remuneration of UK and US executives and their diversification needs, as well as the 
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tax and regulatory regime in the UK. Section IV covers data sources, measurement 
and descriptive statistics. Section V discusses calendar time excess returns and the 
results of univariate tests. In section VI we present our multivariate analysis, whilst 
section VII concludes. 
 
II. LITERATURE 
 
The main focus of the literature on the informativeness of insiders’ trades has 
been on standard purchase and sale decisions. The research concludes that there is 
information content in these trades, most significantly in relation to stock purchases, 
and has been documented both for the US and the UK. The general consensus 
emerging from US research is that purchases have predictive ability for up to a year, 
but that sales have little information for future stock returns (see, Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001) and Jeng et al. (2003)). Research on UK executives by Friederich et al. 
(2002) confirms that purchases are much more informative than sales. There is also 
evidence that insider trade profitability declines as the information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders falls (Frankel and Li (2004)), implying that the 
profitability stems from executives’ use of their inside information. This information 
could be knowledge of future earnings (Ke et al. (2003) and Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2005)), or executives’ contrarian view of firm value (Jenter (2005)).  
As remuneration has become increasingly performance based, of which a 
very significant component comprises executive stock options, so attention has 
begun to focus on the motives for the trading behaviour associated with option 
exercise decisions. Option exercise decisions are normally regarded as being 
uninformed due to the restrictions imposed upon executives as to when they can 
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exercise. However, the apparent lack of an information content in option exercises 
contrasts with the consistent evidence that executives appear to use their inside 
information, particularly when buying shares. If executives are able to make informed 
decisions regarding their standard transactions, it follows they should also be able to 
make informed option exercise decisions. Where executives are free to sell the stock 
acquired at exercise, Carpenter and Remmers (2001) find that post-exercise returns 
are marginally positive, but insignificant, except for a very small sub-sample of top 
managers in the smaller firms where post-exercise abnormal returns are negative. 
Core and Guay (2001) confirm the general absence of information content for US 
non-executives’ option exercise decisions. 
Despite the existing lack of evidence to confirm the use of their private 
information in determining the timing of an exercise decision, there is increasing 
evidence that executives use their information to influence the gains that they can 
earn from their options. This includes executives’ ability to profit from their ability to 
time the option grant (Yermack (1997)), as well as their ability to increase option 
value by timing the disclosure of voluntary announcements (Aboody and Kaznik 
(2000) and Chauvin and Shenoy (2001)). Further, there is evidence that executives 
manage the timing of option repricing events to take advantage of their private 
information (Callaghan et al. (2004)). However, it is increasingly apparent that US 
executives use more than simple timing ability. There is evidence that they back-date 
the option grant date to take advantage of a lower stock price (Narayanan and 
Seyhun (2005) and Lie (2005). This backdating is confirmed by Heron and Lie 
(2006), who show that the pattern of stock returns around the grant date is less 
pronounced since the SEC required option grants to be reported within two working 
days.  
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 The features of executive stock options complicate the analysis of executives’ 
exercise behaviour. In contrast to standard tradable options, executive stock options 
are nontradable, and the assumption that the investor is risk neutral does not apply. 
Executives are unable to hedge by short-selling the underlying stock,1 and are 
therefore unlikely to hold a well-diversified portfolio. The combination of 
nontradability, risk-aversion and the desire to diversify should result in early option 
exercise (Huddart (1994), Huddart (1999) and Hall and Murphy (2002)). The more 
risk-averse an executive, the earlier he will exercise in order to ‘lock-in’ a gain.2 
Moreover, the decision to exercise is likely to be at the expense of the executive’s 
private information. The empirical literature confirms the prevalence of early exercise 
(see Heath at al. (1999) and Bettis et al. (2005) in the US, and Main (1999) in the 
UK)). 
Risk-aversion and a lack of diversification will also drive a wedge between the 
executive’s valuation of an option and its market value (often regarded as a measure 
of the efficiency of stock-based compensation). A number of studies have calibrated 
valuation models, based on plausible levels of executive risk aversion, and show that 
the discount can be significant.3 Alternative approaches, however, stress that the 
disparity in subjective and objective valuations is overstated. One reason is the 
additional effort induced by options (Lambert and Larcker (2004)), another is the 
ability to trade the market portfolio and remove exposure to market risk (Jenter 
(2002)). 
 
III. REMUNERATION AND DIVERSIFICATION IN THE US AND UK 
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Whilst the above literature provides little evidence of informed option related 
trading by executives, it also suggests that their exercise decisions sacrifice a large 
portion of the option value. If executives are prepared to lose option value in order to 
diversify, then it is logical that they will also be prepared to ignore the smaller 
potential gains to be earned from incorporating their inside information in their 
exercise decisions. An additional impediment faced by US executives in the use of 
their inside information are the blackout period restrictions on when they can trade 
(Bettis et al. (2000)). However, UK executives are prohibited only from trading during 
the two months prior to the announcement of year-end or half-year results, affording 
them a greater opportunity to exploit their private information.4  
Despite the early exercise of executive options being a feature of both the US 
and the UK, we argue that UK executives’ need to diversify is less pressing. This is 
because the structure of their remuneration differs significantly from US executives. 
Whilst executive remuneration is lower in the UK, a large portion of the difference is 
due to the aggressive linking of remuneration to their firm’s stock market 
performance in the US. Specifically, UK CEOs receive a much smaller proportion of 
their total remuneration from options, possibly due to greater sensitivity in the UK to 
the level of executive remuneration in general, and option gains in particular.5 This is 
demonstrated by Conyon and Murphy (2000), who show that in 1997 the median 
base salary was £317,000 and £240,000 for US and UK CEOs, respectively. Further, 
given that the median option grant for US CEOs was approximately 16 times that for 
UK CEOs, the option grant comprised 42% (10%) of total remuneration among US 
(UK) CEOs, respectively, a contrast that is unlikely to have diminished since that 
time (Hall and Murphy (2003)). As a result, Conyon and Murphy estimate that the 
effective value of CEOs’ own-firm shareholdings (including unexercised stock 
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options and incentive plans) is approximately ten times larger in the US. The 
similarity in median base salaries combined with the substantial difference in own 
firm shareholdings implies a significant distinction in their exposure to the value of 
their firm’s shares, and hence in their need to diversify. Additionally, vesting periods 
are significantly longer in the UK, reducing the grant value of options (see Huddart 
(1999), Meulbroek (2001) and Hall and Murphy (2002)) and further mitigating UK 
executives’ need to diversify.6 
 We find that executives in the UK sell on average approximately 44% of the 
stock acquired (table 1), compared to near-total selling among US employees (Heath 
et al. (1999)) and US executives (Ofek and Yermack (2000)). The significant 
disparity in trading behaviour is consistent with the need to diversify being less acute 
among UK executives, and raises the possibility that their trades will incorporate their 
inside information. However, since it is cheaper to hold the option, there must be 
good non-information reasons for the early exercise of executive stock options in the 
UK (Main (1999)).  We hypothesise that an important factor motivating executives in 
the UK to exercise early is the regulatory regime, in the form of the four times 
emoluments rule. In addition, we suggest that the tax rules relating to executive 
stock options provide a subsequent incentive to hold the stock acquired at exercise. 
The four times emoluments rule specifies that the amount of options (number 
times exercise price) held by a UK executive be limited to four times emoluments 
(base salary plus bonuses). Introduced by the Finance Act 1984, the rule was 
designed to restrict the value of options that UK executives could hold because of 
the tax advantages associated with approved option schemes. The rule was 
incorporated into the guidelines developed by the Association of British Insurers 
(ABI)7, and persisted even after one of the tax advantages was removed in 1988. 
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Main (1999) states that ‘by this time, the ABI guidelines had assumed a statute like 
status and the four times emoluments rule continued to be implemented.’ Moreover, 
‘very few companies deviated from the strict interpretation of the ABI guidelines.’ 
Exercising therefore provides space for the granting of additional options.  
Once an option has been exercised, the tax framework that applies to 
executive options in the UK gives the executive an incentive to hold the stock 
acquired. The four times emoluments rule was introduced because at that time, 
gains made by executives on approved share options had been taxed at the capital 
gains tax rate (30%), rather than at the income tax rate (60%). Although the two tax 
rates were equalised in 1988, executives in the UK continued to benefit from the 
ability to defer their tax liability by holding the shares acquired at exercise, since they 
paid capital gains tax only when they realised the gain (sold the shares), rather than 
when they exercised their options. Executive options granted in the UK are approved 
share options since they are discretionary and have the associated tax advantage. 
The equivalent tax treatment applies to qualified options in the US. However, most 
options granted in the US are nonqualified (requiring the executive to pay income tax 
on the gain at exercise, whether or not the shares are sold) because nonqualified 
options allow the firm to treat the gain at exercise as a tax-deductible expense. This 
means that, whereas US executives then have an incentive to diversify by selling, 
UK executives have an incentive to postpone their tax liability by holding the 
acquired stock.  
For options granted in the UK after July 1995, however, the executive’s tax 
position is the same as applies to nonqualified options in the US, i.e. tax must be 
paid on the gain made at exercise, whether or not the gain is realised.8 Thus for 
options granted after July 1995, there is no longer a tax incentive to hold stock after 
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exercising. Since executive options in the UK have three-year vesting periods, this 
means that all option exercises up to July 1998 will have benefited from the tax 
regime that was in place before July 1995, and which provided an incentive to defer 
the tax liability by holding at exercise. For example, in March 1997, an executive at 
EMAP Plc exercised options and acquired stock with a value of £900,671. The cost 
of exercising was £222,402, implying a gain at exercise of £678,269. The executive 
held the stock, allowing him or her to defer the associated tax liability of £271,307 
that would be payable on the gain once the stock was sold. Alternatively, from table 
1, the mean exercise value is £128,900. Given a mean moneyness of 3.19, the 
average value of stock acquired at exercise is £411,191, yielding an average gain of 
£282,291 and with it an associated tax liability of £112,916. It is this tax liability that 
the executive is able to defer by holding, rather than selling, the stock acquired at 
exercise. 
 
IV. DATA, MEASUREMENT AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The data include all executive transactions in the UK and are provided by 
Directus Ltd.9 Stock options in the UK are granted only to senior executives, not non-
executives. We analyse the period from 17 July 1995 to 3 July 1998. We exclude the 
period prior to July 1995 because there was an expectation that the tax change 
would be recommended, and that it could be retrospective (i.e. it could apply to 
options granted before July 1995). Exercises immediately prior to July 1995 might 
have been motivated by an attempt to avoid the expected change in tax regime. 
Indeed, during the three months prior to the change, the proportion sold is marginally 
higher, at 51 per cent.  
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Our sample runs to July 1998 because, with a three-year vesting period, we 
can be sure that all options exercised up to July 1998 were granted before July 
1995, and therefore before the change in tax rule introduced in July 17 1995. Option 
exercises after July 1998 could be subject to either tax rule, depending on whether 
they were granted before or after July 1995.10 There are 3629 executive option 
exercises recorded during the period. Where an executive exercises more than once 
on the same day, we aggregate to yield just one exercise per executive per day, 
since we are unable to match an executive’s sale with a specific exercise. Similarly, 
we aggregate the sales (classified as ‘sale post exercise’) where the executive sells 
more than once. Of the resulting sample of 3392 executive stock option exercises, 
513 are excluded due to missing data (most commonly the moneyness of the option 
at exercise). The remaining 2879 exercises comprise our sample.  
Standard event study methodology examines the impact of an event on a 
firm’s returns by calculating post-event abnormal returns using a market model. The 
estimation of a market model is inappropriate since option exercise takes place only 
when an option is in the money, and is therefore dependent on previous stock 
returns (for more on this, see Heath et al. (1999)). We compute individual firm 
abnormal returns by comparing their returns with the returns to a benchmark 
portfolio, composed according to size, book-to-market ratio and momentum. 
Adjusting for size and book-to market is important given the evidence that these two 
factors can explain some of the cross-section of average stock returns.11  As a result, 
measuring abnormal returns through the use of matching benchmark portfolios 
sorted by size and book-to-market is common in the literature (see, for example, 
Gregory (2005)).  
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The likelihood that exercise follows a period of superior returns suggests a 
further sort by momentum, given consistent evidence that stocks exhibit medium 
term return persistence (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993 and 2001) and Rouwenhorst 
(1998)). Lyon et al. (1999) argue that ignoring pre-event return performance induces 
a positive (negative) bias in tests of abnormal returns where firms had high (low) pre-
event returns. Matching firms to benchmark portfolios based on pre-event return 
performance can control for this bias.  
Firms are allocated to one of forty-eight benchmark portfolios on the basis of 
size, book-to-market and previous return (or momentum). We create a set of 4 × 4 
portfolios based on a ranking by size and book-to-market ratio. Each portfolio is then 
subdivided in three based on a ranking of momentum - the firms’ cumulative returns 
over the year preceding the exercise, measured from t - 12 months to t - 31 days (t 
denoting the exercise day). The abnormal return for a firm on a particular day around 
an exercise is the difference between the firm’s return and the equally-weighted 
return to its matching benchmark portfolio. The results reported below are 
qualitatively the same if we create benchmark portfolio returns that are value-
weighted,12 or are based only on size or book-to-market. However, the abnormal 
returns increase when we drop the additional subdivision for momentum effects, a 
finding also reported by Carpenter and Remmers (2001).13 
Table 1 
 Table 1 presents summary statistics for our data. The number of event days is 
the number of days on which at least one exercise takes place, and the number of 
firms represents those having at least one exercise. Overall, there are 2879 
exercises relating to 714 firms on 691 days within the period. These 714 firms 
represent just less than one half of the total number of firms (approximately 1500) 
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listed on the London Stock Exchange at the end of the period. The average number 
of exercises per firm is four, the median three. 206 firms have just one exercise, 132 
have two. The maximum number per firm is 65 (spread among 18 executives), 
although this is an outlier, the next largest having 33 and 22 exercises. A total of 44 
firms have more than 10 exercises during this period. The average proportion of 
stock sold is 44%.14 Below we also distinguish between dividend and non-dividend 
related exercises, of which there are 964 and 1915, respectively. A dividend related 
exercise is one that might be motivated to capture a forthcoming dividend. If dividend 
capture is an important motive for exercise, we would expect the proportion sold to 
be significantly lower among dividend related exercises, yet the average proportion 
sold is only marginally lower at 41.5%. 
Table 1 also reports associated statistics for six cuts of the sample based on 
the proportion sold at exercise. Two are where the executive exercises and holds or 
exercises and sells all the stock acquired, the remaining four represent quartile cuts 
where the executive sells, but does not sell all the stock acquired. The use of four 
intermediate cuts of the sample is designed to provide additional insight into the 
relation between the proportion sold and subsequent returns. The decisions to 
exercise and hold (47%) or exercise and sell all the stock acquired (28%) are most 
common, whilst there are 729 exercises (25% of the sample) where the executive 
sells a proportion less than 1.  
There are systematic differences between the various sub-samples. The 
mean value of exercise for the hold sample (£48,611) is just 38% that of the 
complete sample (£128,912), suggesting that executives are more likely to hold all 
the shares they acquire when the cost of acquiring these shares is relatively small. 
Furthermore, there is some evidence that as the proportion sold at exercise 
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increases, the market capitalisation increases and the moneyness falls. In addition, 
the variations in the previous stock return imply that the proportion of stock sold is 
related to the short-term stock price movement immediately prior to exercise.  
Table 2 
Table 2 presents quartile sorts of the exercises by the respective variables 
that might influence exercise and sell decisions. Again, the proportion sold increases 
with the value of the exercise, firm size and the previous abnormal stock return, and 
declines with moneyness. There appears to be no relation between the proportion 
sold and subsequent return volatility (relative to the market), which would be the 
case if executives’ trades were influenced by their expectations of future volatility.  
The moneyness of the option declines with firm size and value of the exercise, and 
increases with the previous abnormal return and future return volatility. Whilst low 
return volatility exercises are relatively small, when ranked by size there is no 
consistent relation between size and return volatility. 
 
V. CALENDER TIME ABNORMAL RETURNS AND UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
  
The event clustering and overlapping returns that are apparent in the data 
raise an additional methodological issue. Both event clustering and overlapping 
returns induce cross-sectional dependence among the exercises. As a result, we are 
unable to assume that the abnormal returns associated with the exercises are 
independent, and therefore we cannot aggregate the abnormal returns in event time. 
We overcome this by using a calendar-time approach (see, for example, its 
application in Brav and Gompers (1997)). Lyon et al. (1999) show this approach is 
particularly suited to a study in which cross-sectional dependence is induced by 
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overlapping return calculations. Under these circumstances, a traditional event study 
framework would yield misspecified test statistics.15  
The abnormal return (ARit) associated with a particular day for an exercise is: 
( )ititit RERAR −= ,     (1) 
where Rit is the return for firm i on day t and E(Rit) is the firm’s expected return, given 
by the equally weighted return to its matching benchmark portfolio. From the 
abnormal returns to each exercise, we derive a time series of abnormal returns for a 
particular event window. For any event window, the abnormal return each day in 
calendar time (ARt) is the mean abnormal return to the portfolio of firms nt with an 
exercise in the preceding event period:  
∑=
=
tn
1i
it
t
t ARn
1AR .     (2) 
Thus, for example, the abnormal return for a 1 to 30 day post-event window 
on day j is composed of the mean abnormal return to the portfolio of firms with an 
exercise during the 30 days prior to day j. The portfolio components change each 
day. The mean abnormal return (MAR) associated with an event window is the mean 
of the calendar time abnormal returns: 
∑=
=
T
1t
tART
1MAR ,     (3) 
where T is the total number of days within our sample. To test the null hypothesis 
that the mean abnormal return (MAR) is zero, we use a t-statistic derived from the 
time series standard deviation of the abnormal returns σ(AR):  
( ) ( ) T/AR
MARMARt
tσ
= .    (4) 
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 We choose a range of event windows, including a pre-event window from day 
t-30 to day t (to measure the immediate pre-exercise returns), and post-event 
windows up to nine months after exercise. London Stock Exchange rules do not 
permit insider transactions during the two months prior to the year-end or half-year 
earnings announcements. Thus event windows of several months might best capture 
the ability of executives to trade on the basis of information relating to forthcoming 
earnings announcements (see Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) for the importance of 
this as a motivating factor for executives’ trades).  
Our central hypothesis is that the proportion sold reflects the information 
contained in option exercises. Specifically, we hypothesise that the proportion sold 
will be negatively related to post-exercise stock returns.16 We examine this by 
breaking down our sample into six subsamples based on this proportion. Table 3 
presents the resulting calendar time abnormal returns. There is clear evidence in 
table 3 that the proportion sold at exercise increases with the pre-exercise abnormal 
returns, consistent with executives attempting to lock-in short-term gains (Hall and 
Murphy (2002)). There is also evidence that post-exercise return performance 
worsens as the proportion sold increases. Post-exercise abnormal returns are 
significantly negative measured over the 3, 6 and 9-month windows where the 
executive sells between 50-75%, 75-100% and 100% of the stock acquired at 
exercise. This is consistent with our a priori expectations. The tax regime provides a 
strong incentive to hold after exercising. This, together with the diminished need to 
diversify (compared to the US) implies that executives in the UK are more likely to 
exercise and sell if they have negative expectations about the future performance of 
the stock.  
Table 3 
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Also evident from the results in table 3 is that the post-exercise return 
performance does not decrease monotonically with the proportion sold. This would 
be a concern if the proportion sold were regarded purely as a reflection of 
executives’ information about the firm. However, as noted above, there are other 
motivating factors behind their trades, including the need to diversify, which although 
is less important among UK executives could nevertheless still be a reason to sell 
the acquired stock. Executives who are exercising to diversify will, by definition, sell 
most (if not all) of the stock they acquire at exercise. These uninformed trades will 
therefore reduce the extent to which the proportion sold reflects the informativeness 
of the exercise, particularly where executives sell all the stock,17 and explain why the 
relation between returns and proportion sold is not monotonic.   
Table 4 
An important motive that we are able to control for is the desire by executives 
to capture a dividend. Since an option holder is not entitled to the dividend, a non-
information motive for exercising is to capture a dividend that has already been 
announced, but not yet paid. We therefore sub-divide our sample of exercises into 
those that occur prior to the payment of a dividend (the ex-dividend date), and those 
that do not. However, as noted above, if dividend capture is an important motive for 
exercise, executives should hold a larger proportion of the stock acquired when 
capturing a dividend. The sale proportion is indeed lower, but at 41.5% the difference 
is not significant. Despite this, the results presented in table 4 are consistent with 
dividend related exercises being uninformed relative to non-dividend related 
exercises. It is only the exercises categorised as non-dividend related that yield 
abnormal returns, particularly where the executive sells in excess of 50% of the 
stock acquired.      
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Table 5 
In addition to executives’ expectations regarding the future direction of the 
stock price, option exercise could also be informative about future return volatility. An 
important factor in determining option value is stock return volatility. All option pricing 
models stress a positive relation between expected volatility and the value of the 
option. In related research, there is evidence that firms’ put option sales precede falls 
in volatility (Jenter et al. (2006)), consistent with executives having information about 
future return volatility. An expectation of a fall in future return volatility could therefore 
also be a motive for the decision to exercise, irrespective of an executive’s 
expectations regarding the direction of subsequent stock price movements. Table 5 
presents the associated results, using a similar approach to that in Jenter et al. 
(2006). We use three different measures of volatility; the daily standard deviation of 
raw returns, the daily standard deviation of market adjusted returns (market adjusted 
1), and the daily standard deviation of raw returns minus the daily standard deviation 
of market returns (market adjusted 2).  
However, rather than there being a reduction in return volatility after exercise 
consistent with exercise being motivated by the desire to avoid an expected decline 
in option value, there is some evidence of increased volatility, particularly over a 200 
trading day window. The ‘Market Adjusted 2’ measure yields significant increases in 
volatility after exercise over the 200-day window for all but the hold and sell 75-100% 
samples. One explanation for these results is that executives’ trading decisions are 
motivated by the need to diversify, since an undiversified executive will be sensitive 
to increases in expected future stock volatility. The evidence to support a lack of 
diversification argument is weak, however, since this view would predict an 
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increasing relation between the proportion of stock sold at exercise and post-
exercise return volatility.   
 
VI. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
The results presented in tables 3 through 5 are consistent with executives’ 
trades at exercise incorporating their negative information about their firm’s future 
return performance. Yet two issues remain. First, the analysis of table 3 is based on 
a univariate approach, and does not allow for the additional factors that might 
motivate, or impact upon, their trading decisions. Accounting for these factors is 
clearly important, and requires a multivariate analysis. Second, as noted above, 
option valuation models propose a strong positive relation between stock return 
volatility and option value. Executives’ trading decisions might therefore be motivated 
by their expectations of future return volatility. Specifically, a reduction in future 
return volatility reduces the value of the options they hold, making it more likely that 
they will exercise. Again, as noted above, the analysis is not straightforward, since a 
reduction in future return volatility also mitigates the need to diversify. Nevertheless, 
this offers an interesting testable proposition of whether executives’ trading decisions 
are informative about future stock return volatility. We test for both of these issues, 
viz., the hypotheses of negative private information and anticipation of future 
volatility, in multivariate regression settings. In order to conduct the multivariate 
analyses we have to use event time abnormal returns rather than the calendar time 
abnormal returns of table 3.  
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 We test if executives’ private negative information about their firm’s future 
return performance motivates their trades at exercise by estimating the following 
regression: 
1 2 1 3 2 4 3 5 4 6
1 2 3 4 (5)
i ALL ALL
t t t t t
AR H S S S S S
M PR VE Z e
β β β β β β
γ γ γ γ
= + + + + +
+ + + + +  
where iAR (i = 1,.., 4), the dependent variable, represents abnormal returns 
measured over 30-day, 3, 6 and 9-month windows following option exercise. The use 
of private information in executives’ trading decisions implies negative subsequent 
abnormal returns. A sub-set of regressors in (5) precisely captures the different 
proportions sold at exercise. The variable HALL captures exercises that are all (100%) 
hold; S1 captures 0 < sell ≤ 0.25 proportion; S2 covers 0.25< sell ≤ 0.5; S3 captures 
0.50 < sell ≤ 0.75; S4 when 0.75 < sell < 1; and SALL when all (100%) of the stock 
acquired at exercise is sold. The other regressors – Mt, VEt and Zt denote the option 
moneyness, value of the exercise and firm size respectively. Likewise, PRt denotes 
the previous short-term abnormal return measured over 30 days prior to exercise 
and et is the regression error term.  
 If executives’ trading decisions are motivated by their negative private 
information about their firm’s future return performance, then the parameters iβ , 
(i=2,..,6), in equation (5), and particularly those associated with a high sale 
proportion, must be negatively signed and significant. The moneyness of the option 
is the ratio of the stock price to the exercise price, and is an important consideration 
for executives when exercising. The only cost incurred when holding an option is the 
dividends foregone. In contrast, exercise requires payment of the exercise price, 
together with the implicit cost of the loss of the option’s time value. This time value 
falls with moneyness, making exercise of near-the-money options relatively 
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expensive. Therefore, if an executive does not need to exercise to diversify, a near-
the-money exercise is more likely to be driven by negative information. Hence, if loss 
of time value is important, we expect 1γ  to be positive and significant. 
The previous stock return is an important factor since risk-averse employees 
will exercise early to lock in gains following a period of abnormal stock returns (Hall 
and Murphy (2002)). This is supported by evidence that option exercise is positively 
related to previous short-term returns (Heath et al. (1999) and Bettis et al. (2005)). 
Similar results are obtained by Core and Guay (2001) for options held by non-
executive employees and by Poteshman and Serbin (2002) for traded options. If the 
motive to capture gains is strong (irrespective of any private information that they 
possess), then 2γ  should be positive and significant. This also implies that these 
positive returns continue after exercise, suggesting they exercise prematurely. 
The value of the exercise is important given evidence that trade size is an 
indicator of trade informativeness (Friederich et al. (2002)). They find that for 
standard executive transactions in the UK, relatively low value trades (£5,000 - 
£70,000) are more informative than larger ones. A negative relation between trade 
size and trade informativeness implies a positive coefficient on the value of the 
exercise; hence we expect 3γ > 0. 
The decisions taken by executives in smaller firms will be more profitable (and 
therefore more informed) if investors are at a greater informational disadvantage in 
these firms.18 This could be driven, in part, by a lower level of analyst following in 
smaller firms (Frankel and Li (2004)). We include the market value of the firm to 
capture the impact of firm size. Given that executives’ information advantage is likely 
to be negatively related to firm size, we expect St to assume positive and significant 
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coefficients (i.e., 4 0γ > ). Equation (5) is our basic specification. It is also likely that 
option exercise might be timed to capture a dividend payment. In our estimations, we 
allow for this issue by conducting separate analyses for dividend and non dividend 
related exercises.  
Stock return volatility can have a significant impact on both the option value 
and the overall risk of an undiversified executive’s position in the stock. Therefore, 
option exercise could be motivated by an expectation of a change in volatility. We 
test if executives’ trading decisions are motivated by their perceptions about future 
stock return volatility as follows: 
1 2 1 3 2 4 3 5 4 6 1 (6)j ALL ALL t p tVOL H S S S S S VOLθ θ θ θ θ θ ψ ε−= + + + + + + +  
where the dependent variable, VOLj, (j=1,2,3) is the volatility of future stock returns. 
Future volatilities are measured over 50, 100 and 200 days following exercise. The 
regressor, VOLt-p, (p=1,2,3) denotes past volatility measured over 50, 100 and 200 
days prior to exercise. We follow Jenter et al. (2006), and compute return volatility as 
the daily standard deviation of raw returns minus the daily standard deviation of 
market returns (denoted as the ‘market adjusted 2’ measure in table 5). The 
remaining regressors in (6) are the different proportions sold at exercise, which are 
defined as above. If executives’ trading decisions are influenced by their expectation 
that future returns will be less volatile, then we expect kθ (k= 2,..,6) to be significantly 
negative. Following the ARCH and GARCH literature, we expect past volatility to 
impact positively on future volatility and hence, 1ψ >0.  In order to confirm the 
robustness of our results, we also allow for option moneyness (Mt), value of the 
exercise (VEt), firm size (St) and the abnormal return measured over the 30 days 
prior to exercise (PRt). 
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In equations (5) and (6) the dependent variables, respectively, are future 
abnormal returns and future stock return volatility. Hence endogeneity is not an 
issue. The standard OLS estimator maintains its consistency. However, 
heteroscedasticity and possible multicollinearity could prove problematic and we 
address them in our estimation. 
Table 6 
 Table 6 reports a correlation matrix of regressors. Of the possible thirteen 
regressors in the two models, only one variable, HAll, shows some degree of 
correlation with the other regressors. Its highest correlation is with ‘SAll’ (-0.583). It is 
also mildly correlated with VE (-0.349) and S4 (-0.322). Of course, as expected, the 
three measures of volatility are highly correlated amongst themselves but we only 
require one measure of volatility at a time in the regression model and so this does 
not pose a problem. For all other pairs, the magnitude of the correlation coefficient is 
very small indeed. We address the collinearity problem associated with HAll by 
capturing its effect through an overall constant term in the regression. We include a 
constant and all the other regressors except HAll in the regression. The constant, by 
definition, is uncorrelated with any of the other regressors. Subsuming HAll into a 
constant term implies that the coefficients of the other proportions represent 
differences from the coefficient of HAll.  
In table 7 we report the results obtained from model (5). Panel A contains 
results based on equally weighted abnormal returns for the 30-day, 3, 6 and 9-month 
windows after exercise.  
Table 7 
These results echo the message presented in table 3. All sale proportions of 
50% or more are negatively signed and highly significant across all the windows 
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under analysis (the exception being S4 which is significant at 10% for the 30-day 
return). The reported t-ratios are based on heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors.19 All exercises where 50% or less is sold are insignificant, the exception being 
S2 (0.25< sell ≤ 0.5), which is negative and significant at 10% for the 30-day window. 
Overall, exercises where more than 50% is sold are followed by significant negative 
abnormal returns, whereas those where less than 50% is sold are not. The constant 
term captures the effect of an exercise and hold (HALL) and, as expected, appears 
insignificant throughout. Consistent with the results reported in table 3, the 
regression results do not support a monotonic relation between the proportion sold 
and post-exercise abnormal return. As before, we suggest that as the proportion sold 
increases, so it is more likely that the trade is motivated by the need to diversify. As 
a result, the informativeness of exercises accompanied by total or near-total selling 
of the acquired stock will be reduced.  
 Amongst the control variables, moneyness is insignificant throughout, 
implying that the loss of time value is not an important consideration among UK 
executives. The coefficient on the previous abnormal stock return is positively signed 
and significant across all horizons. Although tables 1 and 2 indicate that the 
proportion sold increases with the previous return, the positive 2γ  implies that high 
previous returns continue after exercise, suggesting executives exercise prematurely 
to lock-in short-term gains. Finally, the coefficients on both firm size and value of the 
exercise are as expected. Firm size is positive and significant for all windows, whilst 
the value of the exercise is significant and positive, except for the nine-month 
window.  
In panel B, we report results for value weighted abnormal returns. The results 
are qualitatively similar to those for equally weighted abnormal returns, the exception 
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being that SAll is the only variable that is significant in explaining 30-day post-
exercise abnormal returns. However, exercises associated with the sale of more 
than 50% are all significantly negative for the 3, 6 and 9-month windows, implying 
that these trades are motivated by executives’ negative private information about 
their firm’s future return performance. As before, the constant term (hold) as well 
exercises with sales of less than 50% are all insignificant. The control variables show 
qualitatively similar results to those reported in panel A.20 
In panels C and D we report results pertaining to dividend and non dividend 
related exercises. We do not report results for the 30-day and 9-month windows to 
conserve space. Exercises that occur after the announcement but prior to the 
payment of a dividend (the ex-dividend date) are classed as dividend related, whilst 
those that do not are classed as non dividend related. Dividend related exercises 
might be motivated by dividend capture rather than by negative private information 
alone. For the non dividend related exercises, we find that for the 3-month window, 
the constant term, which captures an exercise and hold, as well as exercises where 
more than 50% is sold, are negative and significant. Amongst the control variables, 
only the value of exercise is significant. These results are qualitatively similar to 
those for the 3-month windows in panels A and B, except that here the constant term 
is negative and significant and both firm size and previous abnormal stock return are 
insignificant.  
For the 6-month window, exercises where more than 50% are sold are 
negative and significant. The constant term and remaining proportions sold are 
insignificant. Amongst the control variables, moneyness is insignificant whereas 
previous return, the value of exercise and firm size are positive and significant. The 
non dividend results for the 6-month (and 9-month) window are qualitatively identical 
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to the equivalent results in panels A and B. However, for the 30-day window the 
constant term and SAll are negative and significant, S1, S2, S3 and S4 are 
insignificant, whilst amongst the control variables, all but the previous return are 
significant.  
With regard to our central hypothesis that the proportion sold reflects 
executives’ private information, the dividend related results are somewhat weaker 
and therefore lend some support to the univariate results in table 4. Unlike the other 
results in table 7, S4 is not significant in explaining 6-month post-exercise abnormal 
returns. Amongst the control variables only the previous return appears significant. 
The results for the 9-month window (not reported in the table) are qualitatively 
identical to those for 6-months, the exception being that firm size is significant. For 
the 3-month window, the constant is positive and significant whereas exercises 
where 50% or more is sold are negative and significant. The previous return is highly 
significant, moneyness and firm size are marginally significant, and the value of 
exercise is insignificant. For the 30-day window (not reported), the constant term is 
positive and significant and SAll is negative and significant.  
The dividend related results confirm that whilst executives appear to be acting 
on their negative private information, dividend capture might be an additional 
motivating factor for some trading decisions. Of particular note is the contrast in the 
30-day and 3-month windows vis-à-vis the constant term, which captures the effects 
of an exercise and hold. This effect is positive for dividend related exercises and 
negative for non dividend related exercises. This supports dividend capture as a 
motive where the executive exercises and holds prior to a dividend payment, which 
is what an executive would do if capturing a dividend. We are unable, however, to 
explain the negative coefficient for an exercise and hold for non dividend related 
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exercises. The constant term for the 6- and 9-month windows is insignificant in both 
(dividend and non dividend) cases. Again, this is in line with what we would expect, 
since dividend capture is a relatively short-term strategy that should not be evident in 
the longer windows. The evidence, albeit limited, of dividend capture contrasts with 
the results in Carpenter and Remmers (2001). However, their conclusion that 
dividend capture is not important among US executives is perhaps not surprising 
given that US executives sell almost all the stock acquired at exercise.  
We now test whether executives’ trading decisions are informed by their 
expectations regarding future stock return volatility. An expected reduction in return 
volatility reduces option value, providing executives with a motive to exercise their 
options. Model (6) is estimated to test this hypothesis, the results being reported in 
table 8. 
Table 8 
We measure past and future volatility over three alternative windows, 50-
days, 100-days and 200-days. For all three windows, the proportion sold is not 
significant in explaining future volatility. The exceptions are the significance of S1 and 
S2 in explaining future 200-day volatility. The sold proportions, S3, S4 and SALL, which 
contain executives’ negative private information with respect to their firm’s future 
returns, are all insignificant in explaining future return volatility. The constant is 
positive and significant across all specifications, implying the executive exercises 
and holds prior to increased future volatility. This is difficult to justify, since the 
exercise sacrifices a potential increase in option value, whilst holding the stock still 
exposes an undiversified executive to the risk associated with the increased 
volatility. Finally, past 50-day volatility appears highly significant in explaining future 
volatility over all the three windows considered. Likewise, past 100- and 200-day 
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volatilities appear significant, mostly at 10%. The significance of past return 
volatilities in explaining future return volatilities are as expected. 
The insignificance of the proportion sold in explaining future volatility remains 
robust to two alternative specifications. When we estimate model (6) with a constant 
term and the five different proportions sold only (i.e., we drop the lagged volatility 
term from equation (6)), all proportions sold appear statistically insignificant across 
all specifications. Likewise, the results in table 8 remain qualitatively similar when 
equation (6) is augmented by option moneyness, previous 30-day abnormal return, 
value of the exercise and firm size. Overall, the results robustly indicate that UK 
executives’ exercise and sale decisions are not motivated by their anticipation of 
future volatility.21 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
  
Our analysis provides consistent and clear evidence that UK executives’ 
exercise and sell decisions are driven by their private information. Their exercise 
decisions lock-in previous short-term gains, and are followed by negative abnormal 
returns where they decide to sell more than 50% of the stock acquired at exercise. 
This finding is robust to the inclusion of several other factors that might influence 
executives’ exercise and sell decisions, including the value of the exercise, option 
moneyness and firm size. Further, we provide some limited evidence that the 
decision to exercise and hold might also be motivated by dividend capture. However, 
we find no support for executives’ trading decisions being informed about future 
stock return volatility. 
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 Our finding that executives appear to exploit their information advantage when 
selling the stock purchased at exercise contrasts with the existing research that finds 
little evidence of an information content in standard sell transactions. Two possible 
reasons for this are the tax treatment of option gains in the UK, and the way UK 
executives are remunerated. During the period studied, executives were able to 
defer the payment of tax on their option gains if they held the shares acquired. This, 
together with UK executives’ diminished need to diversify (compared to US 
executives), means that selling at option exercise by UK executives is not 
uninformed, but is a decision taken if they expect negative future returns.  
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Table 1 UK Executive Stock Option Exercises - Summary Statistics 
 No. of 
Firms 
No. of 
Event 
Days 
Mkt. Cap. 
£m 
Value of Ex. 
£000’s 
Moneyness Stock 
Return 
Volatility 
Previous 
Return 
% 
 
 
All (n = 2879) 
Average Proportion Sold at Exercise = 43.8% 
 714 691      
mean 
median 
min 
max 
std 
  
  2945
538
1.03
52451
5955
 
128.9
48.8
0.3
3478.7
216.5
 
3.19
2.17
1.03
47.50
3.74
 
0.0082
0.0072
-0.0092
0.0684
0.0071
2.10
1.96
-68.70
66.70
9.64
 
 
Hold (n = 1353) 
 495 542      
mean 
median 
min 
max 
std 
 
  2762
416
1.03
52451
6052
 
48.6
11.2
0.3
2357.7
120.5
 
3.31
2.29
1.04
43.65
3.71
 
0.0081
0.0070
-0.0092
0.0684
0.0075
 
0.62
0.24
-68.70
66.70
10.65
 
 
0< Sell = 0.25 (n = 71) 
 62 58      
mean 
median 
min 
max 
std 
 
  1992
468
14.56
40868
5434
 
151.1
98.1
11.1
1170.2
174.6
 
4.48
3.02
1.03
17.78
3.80
 
0.0091
0.0084
-0.0013
0.0321
0.0063
 
1.85
2.18
-18.23
29.66
8.47
 
 
0.25< Sell =0.50 (n = 152) 
 118 124      
mean 
median 
min 
max 
std 
 
  1966
378
7.20
34432
3997
 
191.1
97.6
8.2
2230.7
260.6
 
3.60
2.62
1.12
19.46
3.07
 
0.0086
0.0077
-0.0050
0.0358
0.0064
 
2.57
1.64
-22.62
30.99
8.10
 
 
0.50< Sell =0.75 (n = 203) 
 145 158      
mean 
median 
min 
max 
std 
 
  2924
548
11.86
49808
6202
 
206.1
106.2
9.4
2561.4
288.6
 
3.03
1.98
1.15
40.67
4.23
 
0.0086
0.0073
-0.0033
0.0394
0.0075
 
3.05
2.18
-19.21
37.69
8.15
 
 
(continued)
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0.75< Sell <1 (n = 303) 
 183 205      
mean 
median 
min 
max 
std 
 
  3343
935
4.29
50915
6343
 
265.1
183.0
9.8
3478.7
312.3
 
2.70
1.88
1.04
26.57
3.24
 
0.0076
0.0069
-0.0053
0.0449
0.0068
 
3.42
3.11
-13.99
54.58
7.77
 
 
Sell All (n = 797) 
 318 418      
mean 
median 
min 
max 
std 
 
  3380
887
2.44
49863
5900
 
180.0
111.5
1.5
1858.8
219.5
 
3.00
2.04
1.07
47.50
3.92
 
0.0082
0.0075
-0.0069
0.0503
0.0067
 
3.78
3.23
-20.47
62.92
8.78
 
        
        
 
All represents the complete sample of exercises occurring between July 1995 and July 1998 for which 
we have the associated data. The sample is broken down into six subsamples according to the 
proportion of stock sold at exercise. No. of firms is the number of firms for which there is at least one 
option exercise in the respective categories. No. of Event Days denotes the number of days during 
the sample period on which at least one exercise occurs. Value of Ex. is the value of the exercise 
(number of shares times the exercise price). Mkt. Cap. is the market capitalisation of the firm at the 
time of exercise. Moneyness is the ratio of the stock price to the exercise price at the time of exercise. 
Stock return volatility is the daily standard deviation of raw returns minus the daily standard deviation 
of market returns, estimated over 200 trading days after an exercise. The previous return is the 
stock’s abnormal return measured over the 30 days up to the exercise. 
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Table 2 UK Executive Stock Option Exercises – Trade Distribution  
 Prop. 
Sold 
Mkt. Cap.   
£m 
Value of Ex. 
£000’s 
Moneyness Stock 
Return 
Volatility 
Previous 
Return 
% 
       
Exercises sorted by Market Capitalisation 
       
Small Mkt. Cap. 0.33 55 54.2 3.75 0.0083 2.44
 0.43 295 101.1 3.70 0.0071 1.48
 0.50 1472 153.0 2.77 0.0084 2.05
Large Mkt. Cap. 0.49 9978 207.6 2.52 0.0090 2.42
       
Exercises sorted by Value of Exercise 
       
Low Value Ex. 0.11 3128 5.9 3.21 0.0082 0.22
 0.33 1931 23.6 3.89 0.0086 1.80
 0.61 2240 97.6 3.11 0.0075 3.40
High Value Ex. 0.71 4483 389.4 2.53 0.0084 2.97
      
Exercises sorted by Moneyness 
       
Low Moneyness 0.49 2456 136.8 1.38 0.0073 1.40
 0.49 3537 161.9 1.88 0.0076 1.39
 0.40 3268 121.0 2.58 0.0074 2.11
High Moneyness 0.37 2516 95.9 6.92 0.0104 3.49
       
Exercises sorted by Stock Return Volatility 
       
Low Volatility 0.44 609 98.0 2.76 0.0011 1.54
 0.42 3316 140.0 2.76 0.0057 2.07
 0.45 4516 146.4 2.97 0.0087 1.49
High Volatility 0.44 3333 131.2 4.26 0.0172 3.28
       
Exercises sorted by Previous Return 
       
Low Prev. Return 0.30 2365 93.7 2.96 0.0088 -8.82
 0.45 3276 137.6 2.87 0.0072 -0.65
 0.49 3095 142.1 3.38 0.0074 4.31
High Prev. Return 0.51 3043 142.2 3.54 0.0093 13.54
       
       
 
This table presents the distribution of trades for exercises sorted by the factors that impact on 
executives’ exercise and sell decisions. Prop. Sold is the proportion of the stock acquired at exercise 
that is sold. Value of Ex. is the value of the exercise (number of shares times the exercise price). Mkt. 
Cap. is the market capitalisation of the firm at the time of exercise. Moneyness is the ratio of the stock 
price to the exercise price at the time of exercise, whilst stock return volatility is the daily standard 
deviation of raw returns minus the daily standard deviation of market returns, estimated over 200 
trading days after an exercise. The previous return is the stock’s abnormal return measured over the 
30 days up to the exercise. 
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Table 3 Abnormal Returns Around Option Exercises Categorised by 
Proportion Sold 
 
Stock Option Exercises July 1995 – July 1998 
 -30 to 0 +30 days +3 months +6 months +9 months 
      
Hold 0.66 0.35 0.52 0.83 1.39 
n=1353 [1.74] [1.23] [1.13] [1.16] [1.42] 
      
0< Sell = 0.25 2.16 0.11 2.36 1.65 4.15 
n=71 [1.77] [0.10] [1.47] [0.69] [1.42] 
      
0.25< Sell =0.50 2.90 -1.26 -0.47 1.83 1.85 
n=152 [3.73] [-1.67] [-0.39] [1.09] [0.84] 
      
0.50< Sell =0.75 4.11 -0.60 -4.32 -4.84 -6.14 
n=203 [6.19] [-1.02] [-3.66] [-3.25] [-3.06] 
      
0.75< Sell <1 4.19 0.12 -2.02 -3.59 -5.04 
n=303 [5.82] [0.24] [-2.43] [-2.84] [-3.05] 
      
Sell All 4.48 -1.04 -1.76 -1.83 -3.28 
n=797 [9.76] [-2.49] [-2.77] [-1.86] [-2.53] 
      
Difference  
in Means 
     
      
Hold v. Sell All -3.83 1.39 2.28 2.66 4.67 
 [-6.43] [2.74] [2.91] [2.19] [2.88] 
      
 
This table presents the mean percentage abnormal return for samples of exercises categorised by the 
proportion sold at exercise. Hold represents the abnormal return for exercises not accompanied by a 
sale, while Sell All represents abnormal returns for exercises accompanied by the sale of all exercised 
stock. The remaining four sub-divisions represent samples based on partial sales of stock exercised. 
Thus 0< Sell =0.25 denotes exercises accompanied by a sale of between 0 and 25% of the stock 
purchased at exercise. Hold v. Sell All is the difference between the Hold and Sell All abnormal 
returns. Mean percentage abnormal returns are measured over the respective windows using a 
calendar time methodology. Calendar day abnormal returns are the mean abnormal returns to all 
those firms that have an event such that they lie within the particular window on that day. A firm’s 
abnormal return each day is that firm’s return minus the firm’s respective benchmark portfolio return. 
The corresponding t-statistics, measuring significance from zero, are in brackets. 
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Table 4 Abnormal Returns Around Dividend and Non Dividend Related Option 
Exercises Categorised by Proportion Sold 
 
Stock Option Exercises July 1995 – July 1998 
 -30 to 0 +30 days +3 months +6 months +9 months 
     
  Dividend Related   
Hold 0.93 1.70 0.89 0.84 0.76 
n=485 [1.22] [3.57] [1.18] [0.75] [0.50] 
      
0< Sell = 0.25 1.98 0.19 0.75 4.12 -3.19 
n=20 [1.01] [0.11] [0.27] [0.88] [-0.54] 
      
0.25< Sell =0.50 1.58 1.28 1.20 -1.30 -1.44 
n=40 [1.32] [0.74] [0.53] [-0.46] [-0.41] 
      
0.50< Sell =0.75 3.97 0.91 -5.73 -5.67 -9.36 
n=66 [2.46] [0.73] [-1.54] [-1.32] [-1.54] 
      
0.75< Sell <1 4.40 0.90 -0.56 0.33 0.54 
n=101 [3.89] [0.28] [--0.46] [0.18] [0.23] 
      
Sell All 4.30 0.05 -2.08 -0.33 -1.09 
n=253 [5.43] [0.08] [-1.88] [-0.24] [-0.56] 
      
  Non Dividend Related   
Hold 0.42 -0.27 0.16 0.64 1.54 
n=868 [0.94] [-0.73] [0.27] [0.73] [1.15] 
      
0< Sell = 0.25 2.13 -0.93 -0.20 -1.71 3.62 
n=51 [1.51] [-0.67] [-0.09] [-0.52] [1.03] 
      
0.25< Sell =0.50 3.74 -1.59 -0.31 3.79 3.32 
n=112 [3.89] [-1.80] [-0.22] [1.84] [1.24] 
      
0.50< Sell =0.75 3.85 -0.96 -3.63 -4.63 -5.38 
n=138 [5.27] [-1.32] [-2.90] [-2.83] [-2.40] 
      
0.75< Sell <1 4.56 -0.91 -3.09 -6.05 -8.16 
n=202 [4.96] [-1.46] [-2.88] [-3.51] [-3.61] 
      
Sell All 4.02 -1.29 -1.90 -2.71 -4.55 
n=544 [7.71] [-2.27] [-2.43] [-2.22] [-2.96] 
      
 
This table presents the mean percentage abnormal return for samples of dividend and non dividend 
related exercises, categorised by the proportion sold at exercise. Hold represents the abnormal return 
for exercises not accompanied by a sale, while Sell All represents abnormal returns for exercises 
accompanied by the sale of all exercised stock. The remaining four sub-divisions represent samples 
based on partial sales of stock exercised. Mean percentage abnormal returns are measured over the 
respective windows using a calendar time methodology. Calendar day abnormal returns are the mean 
abnormal returns to all those firms that have an event such that they lie within the particular window 
on that day. A firm’s abnormal return each day is that firm’s return minus the firm’s respective 
benchmark portfolio return. The corresponding t-statistics, measuring significance from zero, are in 
brackets. 
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Table 5 Changes in Stock Return Volatility Around Option Exercises 
Categorised by Proportion Sold 
 
          
 Raw Returns Market Adjusted 1 Market Adjusted 2 
Trading Window 50  100 200 50 100 200 50 100 200 
          
Hold 0.00 0.09 0.24 0.00 0.11 0.27 -0.03 0.01 0.06 
N=1353 [0.02] [1.79] [4.66] [0.14] [2.51] [6.78] [-0.58] [0.25] [1.16] 
          
0< Sell = 0.25 -0.04 0.20 0.46 -0.06 0.18 0.42 -0.05 0.15 0.31 
n=71 [-0.30] [1.62] [3.41] [-0.50] [1.56] [3.31] [-0.32] [1.32] [2.55] 
          
0.25< Sell =0.50 0.13 0.21 0.35 0.12 0.21 0.34 0.10 0.15 0.20 
N=152 [1.25] [2.14] [3.41] [1.24] [2.34] [3.61] [1.00] [1.58] [2.17] 
          
0.50< Sell =0.75 0.17 0.21 0.36 0.14 0.19 0.35 0.11 0.10 0.20 
N=203 [1.41] [2.22] [4.05] [1.27] [2.23] [4.35] [0.96] [1.13] [2.34] 
          
0.75< Sell <1 -0.03 0.07 0.21 -0.02 0.09 0.23 -0.06 0.00 0.07 
N=303 [-0.39] [0.97] [3.02] [-0.23] [1.37] [3.56] [-0.71] [0.06] [1.06] 
          
Sell All 0.00 0.12 0.28 0.02 0.13 0.29 -0.04 0.02 0.11 
N=797 [0.14] [2.38] [5.69] [0.46] [2.79] [6.67] [-0.70] [0.45] [2.47] 
          
          
 
This table presents the mean percentage change in volatility around exercises categorised by the 
proportion sold at exercise. Hold represents exercises not accompanied by a sale, while Sell All 
represents exercises accompanied by the sale of all exercised stock. The remaining four sub-divisions 
represent samples based on partial sales of stock exercised. Thus 0< Sell =0.25 denotes exercises 
accompanied by a sale of between 0 and 25% of the stock purchased at exercise. The three volatility 
estimates, Raw Returns, Market Adjusted 1 and Market Adjusted 2 are: The daily standard deviation 
of raw returns, the daily standard deviation of market adjusted returns, and the daily standard 
deviation of raw returns minus the daily standard deviation of market returns, respectively. These 
volatilities are estimated over three trading windows (50 days, 100 days and 200 days) before and 
after an exercise. The corresponding t-statistics are in brackets. 
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Table 6 Correlation Matrix of Regressors 
 Mt VEt Zt SAll S1 S2 S3 S4 HAll PRt Vol-50 Vol-100 Vol-200 
Mt 1             
VEt -0.090 1            
Zt -0.049 0.161 1           
SAll -0.030 0.146 0.045 1          
S1 0.055 0.000 -0.033 -0.088 1         
S2 0.028 0.072 -0.035 -0.144 -0.033 1        
S3 -0.017 0.100 0.000 -0.169 -0.039 -0.064 1       
S4 -0.042 0.211 0.021 -0.211 -0.049 -0.079 -0.094 1      
HAll 0.032 -0.349 -0.029 -0.583 -0.135 -0.219 -0.258 -0.322 1     
PRt 0.069 0.062 0.007 0.108 -0.011 -0.016 0.030 0.047 -0.144 1    
Vol-50 0.154 0.014 0.070 0.020 -0.018 -0.043 -0.016 0.005 0.008 0.170 1   
Vol-100 0.129 -0.006 0.042 0.007 -0.019 -0.027 -0.017 -0.008 0.024 0.078 0.624 1  
Vol-200 0.134 -0.021 0.025 -0.006 -0.024 -0.019 -0.021 -0.014 0.039 0.063 0.512 0.946 1 
Mt is the ratio of the stock price to the exercise price at the time of exercise. VEt is value of the exercise (number of shares times the exercise 
price). Zt is the market capitalisation of the firm at the time of exercise. The variable SALL captures exercises that are all (100%) sold; S1 
captures 0 < sell ≤ 0.25 proportion; S2 covers 0.25< sell ≤ 0.5; S3 captures 0.50 < sell ≤ 0.75; S4 when 0.75 < sell < 1; and HALL when all (100%) 
of the stock acquired at exercise is hold. PRt is the stock’s abnormal return measured over the 30 days preceding exercise. Vol-50, Vol-100 
and Vol-200 are the stock return volatilities estimated over 50, 100 and 200 days before exercise. Volatility is the daily standard deviation of 
raw returns minus the daily standard deviation of market returns. 
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Table 7  Multivariate Analysis of Abnormal Returns after Exercise  
 Panel A:  
Equally Weighted Abnormal Returns 
Full Sample 
Panel B:  
Value-Weighted Abnormal Returns  
Full Sample 
Panel C: 
Non Dividend 
Related Exercises 
Panel D: 
Dividend Related 
Exercises 
Expl.  
Variables 
30 Days 3Months 6 Months 9 
Months 
30 Days 3 Months 6 Months 9 Months 3 Months 6 Months 3 Months 6 Months 
Constant -0.002 
(-0.805) 
0.002 
(0.374) 
0.004 
(0.568) 
0.011 
(1.037) 
-0.005 
(-1.606) 
-0.0001 
(-0.034) 
-0.001 
(-0.089) 
0.008 
(0.708) 
-0.012 b 
(-2.115) 
-0.005 
(-0.611) 
0.023 
(2.236) 
0.018 
(1.234) 
S1 -0.003 
(-0.052) 
0.073 
(0.719) 
0.065 
(0.449) 
0.083 
(0.333) 
0.012 
(0.216) 
0.075 
(0.808) 
0.069 
(0.509) 
0.075 
(0.319) 
0.077 
(0.710) 
0.083 
(0.558) 
0.040 
(0.156) 
0.026 
(0.066) 
S2 -0.031 
(-1.867) 
0.006 
(0.225) 
0.025 
(0.587) 
0.012 
(0.216) 
-0.022 
(-1.333) 
0.012 
(0.455) 
0.028 
(0.649) 
0.010 
(0.165) 
0.0183 
(0.563) 
0.055 
(1.034) 
-0.036 
(-0.834) 
-0.054 
(-0.790) 
S3 -0.019b 
(-2.017) 
-0.069a 
(-3.597) 
-0.093 a 
(-3.409) 
-0.118 a 
(-3.426) 
-0.006 
(-0.522) 
-0.061 a 
(-3.012) 
-0.082 a 
(-2.838) 
-0.112 a 
(-3.091) 
-0.048 b 
(-2.453) 
-0.076 b 
(-2.463) 
-0.109 a 
(-2.632) 
-0.129 b 
(-2.404) 
S4 -0.009)c 
(-1.725) 
-0.041 a 
(-4.379) 
-0.065 a 
(-4.297) 
-0.087 a 
(-4.781) 
-0.008 
(-1.30) 
-0.044 a 
(-4.373) 
-0.066 a 
(-4.033) 
-0.087 a 
(-4.572) 
-0.048 a 
(-3.866) 
-0.088 a 
(-4.372) 
-0.030 b 
(-2.271) 
-0.021 
(-1.028) 
SALL -0.014a 
(-3.683) 
-0.025 a 
(-3.952) 
-0.031 a 
(-3.194) 
-0.0468 a 
(-3.740) 
-0.013 a 
(-3.126) 
-0.023 a 
(-3.420) 
-0.031 a 
(-3.110) 
-0.047 a 
(-3.643) 
-0.020 a 
(-2.602) 
-0.027 b 
(-2.330) 
-0.037 a 
(-3.068) 
-0.038 b 
(-2.174) 
Mt 0.001 
(1.356) 
-0.001 
(-0.773) 
-0.001 
(-0.897) 
-0.002 
(-0.779) 
0.001 
(1.389) 
-0.001 
(-0.978) 
-0.003 
(-1.405) 
-0.003 
(-1.405) 
0.002 
(1.513) 
-0.0004 
(-0.341) 
-0.004 c 
(-1.845) 
-0.003 
(-0.824) 
PRt 0.042c 
(1.944) 
0.101 a 
(2.751) 
0.244 a 
(4.597) 
0.323 a 
(4.775) 
0.034 
(1.485) 
0.098 a 
(2.658) 
0.248 a 
(3.975) 
0.302 a 
(4.209) 
0.076 
(1.622) 
0.203 a 
(2.974) 
0.153 a 
(2.779) 
0.336 a 
(4.156) 
VEt 1.5e-008b 
(2.148) 
2.0e-008 b 
(1.816) 
3.4e-008 b 
(2.423) 
1.8e-008
(0.825) 
1.3e-008 b 
(1.720) 
1.9e-008 
(1.576) 
3.8e-008b 
(2.438) 
1.0e-008 
(0.490) 
4e-008 a 
(3.103) 
5.6e-008 b 
(2.371) 
8e-010 
(0.051) 
1.8e-008 
(0.084) 
Zt 5.6e-007b 
(2.009) 
7.9e-007 b 
(2.475) 
1.2e-006 b 
(2.511) 
2.2e-006 a 
(3.781) 
1.2e-006 b 
(1.865) 
1.4e-006 b 
(2.302) 
3.0e-006 a 
(3.476) 
4.8e-006 a 
(5.476) 
7e-007 
(1.628) 
1.5e-006b 
(2.222) 
1e-006 c 
(1.901) 
1.1e-006 
(1.593) σ  0.081 0.137 0.207 0.271 0.087 0.140 0.213 0.277 0.133 0.207 0.142 0.206 
2R  0.011 0.018 0.023 0.024 0.013 0.019 0.029 0.030 0.018 0.024 0.043 0.032 
Obs. 2879 2879 2879 2879 2879 2879 2879 2879 1915 1915 964 964 
In our specification, the constant term captures the effects of HALL when all of the stock acquired at exercise is held. The variable SALL captures 
exercises that are all (100%) sold; S1 captures 0 < sell ≤ 0.25 proportion; S2 covers 0.25< sell ≤ 0.5; S3 captures 0.50 < sell ≤ 0.75; S4 when 0.75 < 
sell < 1. Mt is moneyness defined as the ratio of the stock price to the exercise price at the time of exercise. PRt is the stock’s abnormal return 
measured over the 30 days up to the exercise. VEt is the value of the exercise (number of shares times the exercise price) and Zt denotes the firm 
size measured by the market capitalisation of the firm at the time of exercise. Reported results are obtained by the OLS estimator. Figures within 
parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent t-ratios.  Superscripts a, b and c respectively denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% or better. 
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Table 8: Multivariate Analysis of Future Return Volatility and Option Exercise 
Explanatory  
Variables 
Vol+50 Vol+100 Vol+200 
Constant 0.004a 
(14.872) 
0.005 a 
(4.223) 
0.005 a 
(3.360) 
0.004 a 
(18.773) 
0.005 a 
(4.889) 
0.005 a 
(3.848) 
0.005 a 
(21.408) 
0.006 a 
(5.699) 
0.005 a 
(4.523) 
S1 -0.002 
(-0.504) 
-0.002 
(-0.535) 
-0.002 
(-0.348) 
0.003 
(0.820) 
0.003 
(0.757) 
0.004 
(0.957) 
0.012b 
(2.021) 
0.012 b 
(2.117) 
0.013b 
(2.266) 
S2 0.001 
(0.841) 
0.0004 
(0.312) 
0.0003 
(0.243) 
0.002 
(1.475) 
0.001 
(0.826) 
0.0009 
(0.759) 
0.003 b 
(2.275) 
0.002 c 
(1.695) 
0.002 
(1.623) 
S3 0.002 
(1.343) 
0.002 
(1.323) 
0.002 
(1.438) 
0.0005 
(0.581) 
0.0005 
(0.563) 
0.0006 
(0.717) 
0.001 
(1.353) 
0.001 
(1.370) 
0.001 
(1.545) 
S4 -0.0004 
(-0.791) 
-0.0002 
(-0.471) 
-0.0001 
(-0.261) 
-0.0006 
(-1.430) 
-0.0005 
(-1.025) 
-0.0003 
(-0.787) 
-0.0006 
(-1.383) 
-0.0004 
(-0.961) 
-0.0003 
(-0.698) 
SALL -3.9e-005 
(-0.121) 
7.1e-005 
(0.217) 
0.0002 
(0.528) 
-0.0001 
(-0.468) 
-2.4e-005 
(-0.081) 
7.5e-005 
(0.262) 
6.7e-005 
(0.246) 
0.0002 
(0.655) 
0.0003 
(1.075) 
Vol-50 0.457a 
(16.232) 
- - 0.458a 
(16.850) 
- - 0.450a 
(16.521) 
- - 
Vol-100 - 0.299c 
(1.859) 
- - 0.295c  
(1.880) 
- - 0.330b 
(2.327) 
- 
Vol-200 -  0.320c 
(1.694) 
- - 0.320c 
(1.716) 
- - 0.353b 
(2.097) 
 σ  0.007 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 
2R  0.171 0.102 0.105 0.213 0.129 0.158 0.217 0.163 0.165 
Obs. 2879 2879 2879 2879 2879 2879 2879 2879 2879 
The constant term captures the effects of HALL when all of the stock acquired at exercise is held. 
The variable SALL captures exercises that are all (100%) sold; S1 captures 0 < sell ≤ 0.25 proportion; S2 covers 
0.25< sell ≤ 0.5; S3 captures 0.50 < sell ≤ 0.75; and S4 when 0.75 < sell < 1. Vol-50, Vol-100 and Vol-200 are the 
stock return volatilities estimated over 50, 100 and 200 days before exercise. Vol+50, Vol+100 and Vol+200 are 
the corresponding estimates after exercise. Volatility is the daily standard deviation of raw returns minus the daily 
standard deviation of market returns. Reported results are obtained by the OLS estimator. Figures within 
parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent t-ratios. Superscripts a, b and c respectively denote significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% or better. 
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1 There is recent evidence that some US executives are able to hedge a proportion 
of their options through the use of zero-cost collars and equity swaps (see Bettis et 
al. (2001)).  
 
2 Early exercise is subject to the completion of a vesting period, during which 
executive stock options cannot be exercised. 
 
3 See Lambert et al. (1991), Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002), Meulbroek (2001), 
Ingersoll (2002) and Tian (2004). 
 
4 See the London Stock Exchange’s ‘Model Code’. 
 
5 A further possible reason for the greater use of options by US firms is that the gain 
realised by the executive at exercise is tax deductible by the firm, assuming they are 
nonqualified options. 
 
6 The average time to vest is 23.6 months in the US (Kole (1997)), whereas UK 
guidelines have consistently stressed a minimum vesting period of three years. 
 
7 The Association of British Insurers (ABI) is one of two main associations 
representing institutional shareholders in the UK. The other is the National 
Association of Pension Funds (NAPF). 
 
8 The change was introduced as a result of the Greenbury Report, published on 17 
July 1995. 
 
9 Directus Ltd is a UK corporate directors’ trading information service. It was 
purchased by Primark from BARRA (UK) Ltd in 2000, before being acquired by 
Thomson Financial in 2001. 
 
10 The lack of data on grant dates means that we cannot distinguish between pre- 
and post-July 1995 grants, and therefore we are unable to include option exercises 
after July 1998. 
 
11 The book-to-market ratio has important explanatory power for the cross-section of 
UK stock returns (Strong and Xu (1997)), whilst Fama and French (1998) document 
a value premium for UK stocks between 1975 and 1995 of 2.65%. Dimson and 
Marsh (1999) also confirm the presence of a size effect in the UK stock market. 
Overall, Fama and French (2006) conclude that ‘size and book-to-market or risks 
related to them are important in expected returns.’ 
 
12 See panel B of table 7. 
 
13 Our results below are robust to the exclusion of outlier returns. 
 
14 This includes exercises where there is no associated sale. The average proportion 
sold where executives sell at exercise is 83%. Where executives do sell, it is 
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possible they make subsequent sales of stock. We do not include sales that occur 
some time after an exercise, although the data show that subsequent sales within a 
month of exercise are rare. 
 
15 The drawback is that the computed returns do not correspond to returns that 
would be experienced by investors. It is straightforward to calculate event-time 
abnormal returns (which measure precisely the investors’ abnormal return), but the 
problem of misspecified test statistics remains, and cannot be eliminated by the use 
of, for example, a bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic. 
 
16 We note, however, that there are likely to be a number of other reasons motivating 
executives’ trading decisions, including the need to diversify, dividend capture and 
information about post-exercise stock return volatility. 
17 Data on executives’ shareholdings and outside wealth, if it had been available, 
would have allowed us to exclude trades that are likely to be motivated by 
diversification rather than information. 
 
18 The existing evidence confirms trade informativeness is negatively related to firm 
size (see, for example, Seyhun (1986), Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Carpenter 
and Remmers (2001)). 
 
19 The reported t-ratios are derived using the heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
error due to White (1980). Inferences remain unchanged if heteroscedasticity 
consistent standard errors (HACSEs) due to Andrews (1991) are used. 
 
20 The significance of the proportion sold at exercise is also evaluated by an 
alternate specification: 1 2 3 4 4 5it t t t t t tAR S M PR VE Z eφ φ φ φ φ φ= + + + + + + . In this 
specification, the various proportions sold are lumped together (there is no 
segregation of different proportions sold) and entered as a single regressor (St). In 
this specification, the proportion sold (St) appears consistently negative and 
significant across all windows. Under this specification, it is straightforward to test if 
100% hold (HALL) or different proportions sold (S1, S2, S3, S4 and SAll) exhibit different 
effects on abnormal returns by entering them as additional regressors, preferably 
one at a time. On the differential effects, HALL, S1 and S2 appear insignificant; S3 and 
S4 appear negative and significant whilst SALL appears positive and significant. 
These signs are consistent vis-à-vis the results reported in Table 7 panel A. This 
approach is not fundamentally different from specification (5), and confirms that UK 
executives’ trading decisions are motivated by their private negative information. 
However, this approach lumps all the proportions sold together, thereby masking the 
insignificance of proportions sold which are less than 50%. In view of the 
heterogeneous effects of different proportions sold on subsequent abnormal returns, 
we prefer specification (5).  
    
21 Brooks et al. (2006) provide evidence that the informativeness of insider trading 
varies between sectors. Whilst the heterogeneity of executives’ informativeness 
across sectors is an interesting issue, we cannot pursue this here because of a lack 
of data. 
 
